Monograph
Sanneke de Haan, Enactive Psychiatry. Forthcoming at Cambridge University Press.
Journal Papers
Snoek, A, de Haan, S., Schermer, M., Klosterkötter, D. (2019), On the Significance of the Identity Debate in DBS and the Need of an Inclusive Research Agenda. A Reply to Gilbert, Viana and Ineichen. Neuroethics.
de Haan, S.E. (2017), The existential dimension in psychiatry: an enactive framework. Mental Health, Religion & Culture.
de Haan, S.E. (2017), Missing oneself or becoming oneself? The difficulty of what “becoming a different person” means. AJOB Neuroscience, 8(2): 110-112.
de Haan, S.E., Rietveld, E., Stokhof, M., Denys, D. (2017), Becoming more oneself? Changes in personality following DBS treatment for psychiatric disorders: Experiences of OCD patients and general considerations. PLoS ONE 12-4, pp. 1-27.
de Haan, S.E., Rietveld, E., Stokhof, M., Denys, D. (2015), Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on the lived experience of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients. In-depth interviews with 18 patients. PLoS ONE 10-8, pp. 1-29.
de Haan, S.E., Rietveld, E., Denys, D. (2014), Stimulating good practice: what an embodied cognition approach could actually mean for DBS practice. AJOB Neuroscience 5-4, pp. 46-48. Comment on: Giulio Mecacci & Pim Haselager (2014) Stimulating the Self: The Influence of Conceptual Frameworks on Reactions to Deep Brain Stimulation, AJOB Neuroscience, 5-4, pp.30-39.
de Haan, S.E., Rietveld, Erik, Stokhof, Martin, Denys, Damiaan (2013), The phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-induced changes in OCD: An enactive affordance-based model. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7, pp. 1-14.
de Haan, S.E. (2013), De existentiële dimensie van de psychiatrie: een enactivistische benadering. Psyche & Geloof 24-2, pp. 130-140.
Rietveld, E., de Haan, S.E., Denys, D. (2013), Social affordances in context: What is it that we are bodily responsive to? Brain and behavioral Sciences 36, pp. 436-436.
Van der Kraats, G.B., de Haan, S.E., Meynen, G. (2012), Zelfbeleving in de vroege fase van psychose: een fenomenologisch benadering. Tijdschrift voor Psychiatrie 54-12, pp. 1021-1029.
de Bruin, L.C. & de Haan, S.E. (2012), Enactivism and social cognition: In search for the whole story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics IV (1), pp. 225-250.
de Haan, S.E. & Fuchs, T. (2010), The ghost in the machine: disembodiment in schizophrenia. Psychopathology 43, pp. 327-333.
Laroi, F. & de Haan, S.E. & Jones, S. & Raballo, A. (2010), Auditory verbal hallucinations: dialoguing between the cognitive sciences and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, pp. 225-240.
de Haan, S.E. & de Bruin, L.C. (2009), Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, pp. 373-396.
Book Chapters
Gipps, R.G.T. & de Haan, S.E. (2018), Schizophrenic Autism. In: G. Stanghellini, M. Broome, A. Fernandez, P. Fusar-Poli, A. Raballo, R. Rosfort (eds). Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
de Haan, S.E., Rietveld, E., Denys, D. (2015), Being free by losing control: What obsessive-compulsive disorder can tell us about free will. In: W. Glannon (ed.), Free will and the brain: Neuroscientific, philosophical, and legal perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming.
de Haan, S.E. (2013), Te veel denken is gevaarlijk. Fenomenologie van hyperreflexiviteit en lichaamservaring in de psychiatrie. In: M. Schermer & M. Boenink & G. Meynen (red.), Komt een filosoof bij de dokter. Amsterdam: Boom, pp. 35-48.
de Haan, S.E., Rietveld, E., Denys, D. (2013), On the nature of obsessions and compulsions. In: D. Baldwin & B. Leonard (eds.), Modern Trends in Pharmacopsychiatry – Anxiety Disorders. Basel: Karger. pp. 1-15.
de Haan, S.E. (2011), Fenomenologie van de lichaamservaring. In: D. Denys & G. Meynen (red.), Handboek Psychiatrie en Filosofie. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom, pp. 213-229.
de Haan, S.E. & De Jaegher, H. & Fuchs, T. & Mayer, A. (2011), Expanding perspectives. The interactive development of perspective-taking in early childhood. In: W. Tschacher & C. Bergomi (eds.), The implications of embodiment: cognition and communication. Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 129-151.
de Haan, S.E. (2010), The minimal self is a social self. Comment on Zahavi’s ‘Minimal self and narrative self: A distinction in need of refinement’. In: T. Fuchs & H. Sattel, & P. Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self. Dimensions, coherence, and disorders. Stuttgart: Schattauer Verlag.
Miscellaneous
de Haan, S. & Luigjes, J. (2019) – Waarom we psychiatrische stoornissen geen hersenstoornissen moeten noemen. Blogpost op Bij Nader Inzien.
‘De nacht als buutvrij’. Interview met Hella van der Wijst voor tv-programma De Nachtzoen (21.05.2019).
‘Aan het einde is er geen oké-sticker’. Interview in De Volkskrant met Fokke Obbema (30.09.2018).
de Haan, S.E. (2015) – Complotdenken: gestoord of gezond kritisch? Blogpost op Bij Nader Inzien.
Van Schuppen, L. (2014) – Filosofie en cognitieve wetenschap: Water en olie? Opiniestuk met verwijzing naar het Deep Brain Stimulation project.
de Haan, S.E. (2013) – Wie is er eigenlijk (niet) gek? Voordracht bij Filosofisch Café Nijmegen, 5.11.2013.
Maatz, A & de Haan, S.E. (2103) – Making change happen. Report of the Oxford Conference on Philosophy and Psychiatry, 25-26.07.3013.
